摘要：美国司法部（DOJ）（下称“司法部”）发布首个覆盖除反垄断外所有公司刑事案件的统一《企业执法与自愿披露政策（CEP）》（下称“新政策”），取代此前各部门、各地区零散规定政策，将自愿披露、充分合作、及时整改与“不起诉”“大幅减罚”等梯度结果直接挂钩，以提供透明、可预期的合规激励框架。该政策对在美国有业务、上市、融资、使用美元结算或涉及美国金融机构交易的中资及跨境企业影响深远，明确了企业面临FCPA、洗钱、制裁违规等刑事风险时的决策依据。文章从政策核心变化、与中资企业的关联、“三档结果区间”（不起诉/非起诉协议/有限从宽）、合格自报/合作/整改的标准、典型应用场景等维度展开解析，并提出内部沟通、危机应对、合规机制优化、跨境法律冲突预案、并购条款调整等落地措施，助力企业在新政策框架下平衡风险与机遇，做出科学合规决策。

Abstract：The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has issued the first department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP) applicable to all corporate criminal cases except antitrust violations, replacing the previous fragmented rules across various DOJ components and U.S. Attorney’s Offices. The policy directly links voluntary self-disclosure, full cooperation, and timely remediation to tiered outcomes including declination of prosecution and substantial penalty reductions, thereby providing a transparent and predictable compliance incentive framework. This policy has far-reaching implications for Chinese and other cross-border enterprises with U.S. operations, listings, financings, U.S. dollar settlements, or transactions involving U.S. financial institutions, as it clarifies the decision-making basis for enterprises facing criminal risks such as violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), money laundering, and sanctions non-compliance. This article analyzes the core changes of the policy, its relevance to Chinese enterprises, the three-tier outcome framework (declination of prosecution, Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs), and limited leniency), the standards for qualifying self-disclosure, cooperation and remediation, as well as typical application scenarios. It also proposes implementation measures including internal communication, crisis response, compliance mechanism optimization, cross-border legal conflict preparedness, and M&A clause adjustments, helping enterprises balance risks and opportunities and make sound compliance decisions under the new policy framework.

关键词：CEP、跨境合规、企业刑事执法、合规披露与整改

Keywords：CEP; Cross-border Compliance; Corporate Criminal Enforcement; Compliance Disclosure and Remediation

2026年3月10日，美国司法部发布了首个覆盖全部门的《企业执法与自愿披露政策》（Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self‑Disclosure Policy。[ Department of Justice Releases First-Ever Corporate Enforcement ... https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-releases-first-ever-corporate-enforcement-policy-all-criminal-cases]这是司法部第一次用一份统一文件，规定除反垄断案件以外，公司在美国面临刑事风险时，如果选择自愿披露、配合调查、及时整改，可以在多大程度上争取不起诉或大幅减罚。

On March 10, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice issued the first department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP). This marks the first time the DOJ has established a unified document that stipulates the extent to which companies can seek declination of prosecution or substantial penalty reductions by voluntarily disclosing, cooperating with investigations, and remediating in a timely manner when facing criminal risks in the U.S., with the exception of antitrust cases.

过去几年，司法部刑事司已经有自己的企业执法策略（Corporate Enforcement Policy），一些地区检察官办公室也相继推出本地版自报政策，实务中形成了“多套规则并存”。

In recent years, the DOJ Criminal Division has had its own Corporate Enforcement Policy, and several U.S. Attorney’s Offices have successively introduced local self-disclosure policies, resulting in a landscape of "multiple sets of rules coexisting" in practice.

这次新政策的一个重要变化，是明确写明：它适用于所有美国司法部刑事部门和各地美国联邦检察官办公室——除反垄断案件外，取代此前各组件、各地区的企业执法政策。对在美国有业务、上市、融资、美元结算或经常与美国金融机构、客户交易的企业来说，这意味着：一旦出现涉嫌FCPA、洗钱、制裁违规、证券/会计欺诈等问题，可以参照一套相对统一的规则来分析评估——要不要自报、什么时候自报、如果自报和不自报，结果大致差多少。

A key change of this new policy is its explicit stipulation that it applies to all criminal components of the DOJ and U.S. Attorney’s Offices nationwide – superseding all prior component-specific and U.S. Attorney’s Office-specific corporate enforcement policies, except for antitrust cases. For enterprises with U.S. operations, listings, financings, U.S. dollar settlements, or regular transactions with U.S. financial institutions and clients, this means that in the event of alleged violations such as FCPA breaches, money laundering, sanctions non-compliance, and securities/accounting fraud, they can evaluate based on a relatively unified set of rules: whether to self-disclose, when to self-disclose, and the approximate difference in outcomes between self-disclosure and non-disclosure.

从企业管理层视角，可以把这份新政策看成是在做三件事：

From the perspective of corporate management, the new policy can be summarized into three core initiatives:

第一，把过去分散的“从宽政策”合并成一套部门统一规则。

1.Consolidating the previous fragmented leniency policies into a single department-wide rule

根据司法部的新闻稿，新政策适用于司法部所有公司刑事案件，仅反垄断案件继续适用反垄断司独立的宽大计划。它同时明文规定，原先各刑事组建及各地联邦检察官办公室的企业执法/自愿披露政策，原则上被这套统一新政策所取代。[ Department of Justice Releases First-Ever Corporate Enforcement ... https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-releases-first-ever-corporate-enforcement-policy-all-criminal-cases]这意味着企业无需再因管辖部门的不同而面临迥异的起诉门槛。

According to the DOJ’s press release, the new policy applies to all corporate criminal cases handled by the DOJ, with only antitrust cases continuing to be governed by the Antitrust Division’s separate leniency program. It also explicitly stipulates that the original component-specific and U.S. Attorney’s Office-specific corporate enforcement/voluntary self-disclosure policies are in principle superseded by this unified new policy. This means enterprises no longer face vastly different prosecution thresholds due to different jurisdictional authorities.

第二，把“自愿披露—合作—整改可以争取不起诉/大幅减罚”正式制度化。

2.Institutionalizing the principle that "voluntary disclosure-cooperation-remediation entitles to declination of prosecution/substantial penalty reductions"

新政策延续和强化2025年涉企刑事司法的核心思路：如果企业在满足一定条件下自报、合作、整改，就可以在不起诉、协议类型、罚金幅度、是否指定独立合规监控人等方面获得明显更优的对待。

The new policy continues and strengthens the core approach of corporate criminal justice in 2025: enterprises that self-disclose, cooperate, and remediate in compliance with certain conditions will receive significantly more favorable treatment in terms of declination of prosecution, types of resolution agreements, penalty ranges, and the appointment of an independent compliance monitor.

第三，把“什么算自愿披露、充分合作、及时整改”写得更细。

3.Refining the standards for "voluntary self-disclosure, full cooperation, and timely remediation"

例如，新政策要求自报必须是在美国司法部还不知道、且不存在即将被曝光的紧迫风险时做出的善意披露，并强调披露时间要“合理迅速”；对合作，则整合为“及时、真实、准确地披露与相关行为有关的所有事实与非特权证据”；对整改，则继续强调个人问责、制度修复和资源匹配。[ Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy https://www.justice.gov/dag/media/1430731/dl?inline]

For example, the new policy requires that self-disclosure must be a good-faith disclosure made when the DOJ is not yet aware of the misconduct and there is no imminent threat of exposure, and it emphasizes that the disclosure must be made "reasonably promptly". For cooperation, it is defined as the "timely, truthful, and accurate disclosure of all facts and non-privileged evidence related to the conduct at issue". For remediation, it continues to emphasize individual accountability, institutional remediation, and resource matching.

整体来看，司法部对外强调的关键词是“透明、统一、可预期”，希望通过清晰写明激励机制，推动更多公司在发现问题后尽早站出来沟通，而不是拖延或对抗。[ Department of Justice Releases First-Ever Corporate Enforcement ... https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-releases-first-ever-corporate-enforcement-policy-all-criminal-cases]

Overall, the key words the DOJ highlights to the public are "transparency, uniformity, and predictability". It aims to encourage more companies to come forward and communicate promptly upon discovering misconduct, rather than delaying or resisting, by clearly setting out incentive mechanisms.

这份政策最受关注的一点，是把“自报—合作—整改”和三类典型结果结构直接挂钩，从企业视角看，可以简单理解为三档“结果区间”。

The most notable aspect of this policy is that it directly links "self-disclosure-cooperation-remediation" to three typical tiered outcomes, which can be simply understood as three "outcome ranges" from an enterprise’s perspective.

第一档：在满足条件时，司法部承诺“将不起诉”

Tier 1: The DOJ commits to "declining prosecution" when conditions are met

根据新政策来看，如果企业满足以下条件，司法部在新的部门统一政策下承诺“将不起诉”：

1.向适格的司法部刑事部门“自愿”披露不当行为；

2.在司法部或其他机构尚未掌握该行为，且不存在“即将曝光”的紧迫威胁前完成披露；

3.在法律或合同上对该行为不存在既有强制报告义务；

4.对司法部的调查充分合作；

5.进行“及时且适当”的整改，包括问责涉案人员和强化合规制度；

6.案件不涉及严重加重情节，例如极端恶性、广泛高层参与、重大损害或严重再犯等。

这意味着，在理想情况下，一家在美国有面临刑事追责的公司，如果选择了及时自报并配合，可以争取案件不立案起诉，而是以退还违法所得等方式收尾。对于上市公司或融资中企业，这一结果对股价、声誉、交易进程的影响，与被正式起诉完全不同。

Pursuant to the new policy, the DOJ commits to declining prosecution under the unified department-wide framework if an enterprise meets the following conditions:

1.Voluntarily discloses the misconduct to the appropriate DOJ criminal component;

2.Completes the disclosure before the DOJ or other agencies become aware of the conduct and in the absence of an imminent threat of exposure;

3.Has no pre-existing legal or contractual obligation to disclose the conduct to the DOJ;

4.Fully cooperates with the DOJ’s investigation;

5.Implements "timely and appropriate" remediation, including holding involved personnel accountable and strengthening compliance systems;

6.The case involves no serious aggravating circumstances, such as extreme egregiousness, widespread senior management involvement, substantial harm, or serious recidivism.

This means that under ideal circumstances, a company facing potential criminal prosecution in the U.S. can seek a resolution where the case is not filed for prosecution and is concluded by disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, etc., by choosing to self-disclose and cooperate in a timely manner. For listed companies or those in the process of financing, this outcome has a fundamentally different impact on stock prices, reputation, and transaction progress compared to being formally prosecuted.

第二档：有加重情节，但自报+合作+整改仍可获得较大从宽

Tier 2: Substantial leniency still available for self-disclosure + cooperation + remediation despite aggravating circumstances

在一些存在一定加重情节的案件中（例如涉案金额较大、部分管理层参与等），新政策仍鼓励企业选择自报。根据新政策的描述和实务界解读，这类案件通常来说，企业满足自报、合作、整改的要求，但案件严重性使司法部认为仍需某种形式的刑事解决。这种情形下，倾向使用非起诉协议（NPA）或延期起诉协议（DPA），而不是正式起诉并要求有罪答辩。新政策下，“近乎合格”的自报企业，可获得50%–75%范围内的罚金减免，具体比例由检方裁量，并在多数情况下可以避免指定独立监控人。

The new policy still encourages enterprises to self-disclose in cases involving certain aggravating circumstances (e.g., large amounts in question, involvement of some management personnel). According to the policy’s provisions and practical interpretations, in such cases, enterprises generally meet the requirements for self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation, but the seriousness of the case leads the DOJ to determine that some form of criminal resolution is still necessary. In such situations, the DOJ tends to use Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) or Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) instead of formal prosecution and a guilty plea. Under the new policy, enterprises that make a "near miss" self-disclosure are eligible for a penalty reduction of 50%-75% off the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range, with the specific percentage at the prosecutor’s discretion, and an independent monitor is generally not required.

与旧版刑事司政策相比，新政策将这一档罚金折扣的“自动75%”调整为“50%–75%裁量空间”，但仍维持“通常以NPA解决”的有利预期。

Compared with the previous Criminal Division policy, the new policy adjusts the "automatic 75%" penalty reduction for this tier to a "discretionary range of 50%-75%", but it still maintains the favorable expectation of "resolution typically through an NPA".

第三档：没有自报，但后期积极合作与整改，仍保留一定折扣空间

Tier 3: Limited leniency available for active post-hoc cooperation and remediation without prior self-disclosure

对于没有进行自愿披露、而是被举报、媒体曝光或监管调查推动下才开始配合的公司，新政策也保留了从宽空间，但明显弱于前两档。在这类案件中：

1.一般难以获得不起诉，更多是通过DPA或有罪答辩解决；

2.罚金减免幅度通常明显低于“自报”情形；

3.司法部更有可能要求指定独立监控人，对公司合规体系进行数年的外部监督。

从政策设计可以看出，司法部有意通过这三档差异化结果，把“早期自愿披露”排在最有利的位置，鼓励企业在发现问题后尽快决策，而不是观望或被动等待执法机关上门。[ US encourages companies to report criminal misconduct in new ... https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-encourages-companies-report-criminal-misconduct-new-nationwide-policy-2026-03-10/]

The new policy also provides for leniency for companies that do not make a voluntary self-disclosure but begin to cooperate following a whistleblower report, media exposure, or regulatory investigation, though such leniency is significantly less favorable than the first two tiers. In such cases:

1.Declination of prosecution is generally difficult to obtain, with resolutions more likely through DPAs or guilty pleas;

2.The extent of penalty reduction is typically significantly lower than in cases of self-disclosure;

3.The DOJ is more likely to require the appointment of an independent monitor to conduct external oversight of the company’s compliance system for several years.

对企业管理层和法务/合规团队来说，另一个关键问题是：在新政策框架下，怎样的行为才“够得上”享受以上激励。

For corporate management and legal/compliance teams, another key question is: what conduct is sufficient to qualify for the above incentives under the new policy framework?

（一）自愿披露：时间点和方式很关键

(1)Voluntary Self-Disclosure: Timing and Method are Critical

新政策对“自愿披露”给出了相对清晰的标准：[ Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy https://www.justice.gov/dag/media/1430731/dl?inline]

1.真正自愿：披露必须发生在司法部或其他执法机关掌握实质线索之前，也不能是在媒体或举报已经让问题“几乎必然曝光”的情况下被动披露。

2.无既有义务：仅仅履行原本就存在的法定或监管报告义务，并不足以自动构成新政策意义上的“自愿披露”。

3.合理迅速：司法部强调，希望企业在“合理时间内”披露，即便此时内部调查尚未完全结束，也可以先作初步披露，再随着调查进展补充更多细节。

4.对象正确：披露应提交给适当的司法部刑事部门，而非单纯对其他政府机构或监管机关报告。

The new policy sets relatively clear standards for "voluntary self-disclosure":

1.Truly Voluntary: Disclosure must occur before the DOJ or other law enforcement agencies obtain substantive clues, and not passively after the misconduct is almost certain to be exposed via media or whistleblower reports;

2.No Pre-Existing Obligation: Merely fulfilling an existing statutory or regulatory reporting obligation is not sufficient to automatically constitute a "voluntary self-disclosure" under the new policy;

3.Reasonably Prompt: The DOJ emphasizes that enterprises are expected to disclose "within a reasonably prompt time", and a preliminary disclosure may be made even if the internal investigation is not yet complete, with additional details supplemented as the investigation progresses;

4.Appropriate Recipient: Disclosure must be submitted to the appropriate DOJ criminal component, rather than merely reported to other government agencies or regulatory bodies.

这意味着，一家企业在内部审计中发现潜在FCPA、制裁或洗钱问题时，如果预计存在美国司法风险，是否以及何时向司法部披露，将直接影响其是否还能享受“真正的第一档或第二档”结果。

This means that when an enterprise discovers potential FCPA, sanctions, or money laundering issues through internal audits, the decision of whether and when to disclose to the DOJ will directly impact its eligibility for the truly favorable Tier 1 or Tier 2 outcomes if U.S. judicial risks are anticipated.

（二）充分合作：不仅是“不阻碍”，而是“协助追责个人”

(2) Full Cooperation: Not Merely "Non-Obstruction", but "Assisting in Holding Individuals Accountable"

与一些企业直观理解不同，司法部在新政策中对“合作”的要求，不只是否配合调查，还包括在合理范围内帮助司法部寻找和锁定个人责任。

实务中，司法部期待公司在以下方面积极作为：

1.及时、真实、完整地披露所有与相关行为有关的非特权事实和证据；

2.在法律允许范围内，促成关键员工接受访谈或出庭作证；

3.配合跨境数据、海外服务器的取证，在本国法律允许的框架下给出可执行方案，而不是简单以“数据出境限制”为由一概拒绝；

4.将内部调查成果以司法部易于使用的方式呈现，包括对事实时间线、个人参与程度和内部控制缺陷的清晰分析。

Contrary to the intuitive understanding of some enterprises, the DOJ’s requirements for "cooperation" under the new policy go beyond mere compliance with investigations and include assisting the DOJ in identifying and holding individual wrongdoers accountable to a reasonable extent.

In practice, the DOJ expects companies to take proactive actions in the following aspects:

1.Timely, truthful, and complete disclosure of all non-privileged facts and evidence related to the conduct at issue;

2.Facilitating interviews or testimony of key employees in court to the extent permitted by law;

3.Cooperating with the collection of cross-border data and evidence from overseas servers, and providing implementable solutions within the framework of domestic law, rather than simply refusing on the grounds of "data export restrictions";

4.Presenting the results of internal investigations in a form easily usable by the DOJ, including a clear analysis of the factual timeline, the extent of individual involvement, and internal control deficiencies.

对于具有中国背景的跨境企业，还需要额外考虑中美法律冲突问题，例如数据出境、国家秘密和个人信息保护等。这类问题最好在案件暴露前，就由法务、合规和外部律师事先设计好应对思路，而不是在司法部调查已经启动后临时处理。[ DOJ Corporate Enforcement Update: The New Department-Wide ... https://www.lw.com/admin/upload/SiteAttachments/DOJ-Corporate-Enforcement-Update-The-New-Department-Wide-Self-Disclosure-Policy.pdf]

For cross-border enterprises with Chinese background, additional consideration must be given to Sino-U.S. legal conflicts, such as data export, state secrets, and personal information protection. Such issues should be pre-planned by legal, compliance teams and external counsel before a case arises, rather than being addressed ad hoc after a DOJ investigation has commenced.

（三）及时整改：从问责到“合规投入够不够”

(3) Timely Remediation: From Accountability to "Sufficient Compliance Investment"

在整改方面，新政策延续了司法部近年来的基本思路，更加关注实际效果，而非仅有形式上的制度。重点包括：

1.个人问责：涉案员工和管理人员是否被调查、处分甚至解雇，是否采取追回奖金、取消激励等措施；

2.制度修复：针对案件暴露出来的具体漏洞（例如第三方管理、高风险地区审批、财务控制），是否进行了针对性的制度更新和流程优化；

3.资源匹配：公司合规部门的人力、预算和权限，是否与企业的业务规模和风险水平匹配，而不是“纸面合规”。

In terms of remediation, the new policy continues the DOJ’s basic approach in recent years, with a greater focus on actual effectiveness rather than merely formal institutional frameworks. Key requirements include:

1.Individual Accountability: Whether involved employees and management personnel have been investigated, disciplined or even terminated, and whether measures such as clawing back bonuses and revoking incentives have been adopted;

2.Institutional Remediation: Whether targeted institutional updates and process optimizations have been implemented to address specific vulnerabilities exposed by the case (e.g., third-party management, approval processes for high-risk regions, financial controls);

3.Resource Matching: Whether the human resources, budget, and authority of the company’s compliance department are matched to the enterprise’s business scale and risk level, rather than engaging in "paper compliance".

对企业而言，这些整改措施不仅影响司法部是否要求指定合规监控人，也会影响罚金减免幅度和整体解决方案的形态。

For enterprises, these remediation measures not only impact whether the DOJ requires the appointment of a compliance monitor but also the extent of penalty reduction and the form of the overall resolution.

从跨境企业的角度看，新政策带来的更多是“决策框架”上的变化，而不是简单“风险变大或变小”。下面可以结合几个典型场景来看。

From the perspective of cross-border enterprises, the new policy brings more changes to the "decision-making framework" rather than a simple "increase or decrease in risks". The following typical scenarios illustrate these implications:

场景一：内部已经发现问题，但尚未被外界知道

Scenario 1: Misconduct Discovered Internally but Not Yet Known to the Public

典型情况包括：内部审计发现某境外子公司支付异常、第三方佣金缺乏合理商业理由，或合规举报线索显示可能存在行贿、洗钱或制裁规避行为。在这种情况下，管理层通常会面临几个关键问题：

1.是否可能触发美国司法管辖（例如关联美国发行人、美元结算、在美上市或使用美国金融系统）；

2.如果有风险，我是否应该向司法部自报；如果自报，最佳时机和方式是什么；

3.如果暂不自报，内部调查和整改要做到什么程度，未来一旦问题被曝光，能否在第三档下争取最大限度的从宽。

Typical situations include: internal audits uncovering abnormal payments by an overseas subsidiary, third-party commissions lacking a legitimate business purpose, or compliance whistleblower reports indicating potential bribery, money laundering, or sanctions evasion. In such cases, management typically faces several key questions:

1.Whether the conduct may trigger U.S. judicial jurisdiction (e.g., connection to U.S. issuers, U.S. dollar settlements, U.S. listing, or use of the U.S. financial system);

2.If there are risks, whether to self-disclose to the DOJ, and if so, what the optimal timing and method are;

3.If self-disclosure is delayed for the time being, to what extent should internal investigations and remediation be conducted to maximize leniency under Tier 3 if the issue is exposed in the future.

新政策在这里提供的价值在于：它让管理层可以更可预期地比较“自报”和“不自报”的后果差距，而不仅仅是抽象地担心“会不会惹来更大麻烦”。

The value of the new policy here is that it allows management to compare the consequences of self-disclosure and non-disclosure in a more predictable manner, rather than merely having an abstract fear of "potentially inviting greater trouble".

场景二：已经被问询、举报或媒体关注

Scenario 2: Already Subject to Inquiries, Whistleblower Reports or Media Attention

如果问题已经进入美国证券交易委员会（SEC）民事调查、银行KYC/AML问询或者有媒体调查报道在进行中，是否还能满足新政策意义上的“自愿披露”，就变得更复杂。

If the issue is already under civil investigation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), KYC/AML inquiries by banks, or media investigative reports, it becomes more complex to qualify for a "voluntary self-disclosure" under the new policy.

从公开解读看，只要司法部尚未掌握该行为、也不存在“几乎必然被司法部发现”的紧迫风险，企业仍有一定机会争取在新政策下被视为“实质上的自报”，但空间要远小于完全由公司主动发现并自报的情形。

According to public interpretations, an enterprise may still have a limited opportunity to be deemed to have made a "de facto self-disclosure" under the new policy if the DOJ is not yet aware of the conduct and there is no imminent threat of the DOJ discovering it, but the scope for leniency is far narrower than in cases where the company proactively discovers and self-discloses the misconduct entirely on its own initiative.

在这种“灰区场景”下，如何向司法部讲清楚时间线、公司主动性与内部治理状况，往往直接影响案件能否进入第一档或第二档。

In such "gray area scenarios", the ability to clearly explain the timeline, the company’s initiative, and internal governance to the DOJ often directly impacts whether the case can be categorized into Tier 1 or Tier 2.

场景三：并购、投资和退出中的历史遗留问题

Scenario 3: Historical Legacy Issues in M&A, Investment and Exit

在跨境并购或投资中，收购方时常在尽调阶段或交割后，发现目标公司可能存在历史上的FCPA、制裁或洗钱问题。对于这类型的涉美交易，新新政策提供了一个相对清晰的工具箱：

1.如果收购方在交割后主动按照新政策路线自报、合作、整改，有机会把“继承责任”控制在可管理范围内，甚至在条件满足时争取不起诉；

2.在交易文件中，可以通过约定“发现重大合规问题后的自报决策机制”“与司法部沟通的分工”等条款，提前锁定各方在自报和合作问题上的权利和义务。

3.在投资和估值方面，投资人可以结合新政策所提供的预期：对于已处在司法部视野中的标的，案件更可能通过哪种方式解决、罚金可能有多大折扣、是否需要长期监控人，从而对标的估值和交易结构作出更有根据的判断。

In cross-border M&A or investments, acquirers often discover potential historical FCPA, sanctions, or money laundering issues of the target company during due diligence or after closing. For such U.S.-related transactions, the new policy provides a relatively clear toolkit:

1.If the acquirer proactively self-discloses, cooperates, and remediates in accordance with the new policy after closing, it has the opportunity to control "successor liability" within a manageable range, and even seek declination of prosecution if conditions are met;

2.In transaction documents, the rights and obligations of all parties regarding self-disclosure and cooperation can be pre-locked by stipulating clauses such as the "decision-making mechanism for self-disclosure upon discovery of material compliance issues" and the "division of responsibilities for communication with the DOJ".

3.In terms of investment and valuation, investors can make more informed judgments on the target’s valuation and transaction structure by combining the expectations provided by the new policy: for targets already in the DOJ’s sight, the likely resolution method, the potential extent of penalty reduction, and whether a long-term monitor will be required.

在务实中性的基调下，为将此次新政策变化切实落地，可从几个层面系统推进：

1.内部沟通层面，以非技术语言向董事会及管理层开展专题汇报，阐明司法部现行统一的企业刑事执法政策，以及企业在问题出现后于自报、合作、整改方面的不同选择对处理结果的梯度影响；

2.危机应对层面，在现有跨境合规与危机应对手册中增设固定环节，明确发生重大涉美合规问题时，由专项小组尽快完成初步事实核查，并评估是否依据新政策路径启动自愿披露；

3.合规制度与调查机制层面，检视现有合规体系是否具备高风险交易与支付的早期识别能力、清晰的内部升级路径及跨部门协作机制，能否快速启动内部调查并形成可对外沟通的事实依据；

4.跨境法律冲突应对层面，提前联合外部律师或顾问就跨境数据、保密义务及中外法律冲突等问题，研判司法部要求合作时企业的可行边界，形成内部原则性立场，避免案件进入实质调查后才开展协调；

5.并购投资层面，在涉美并购及投资条款中明确约定，尽调或交割后发现潜在刑事风险时各方如何共同评估自报事宜，以及因自报产生的额外成本与处罚在价款调整、赔偿安排中的分配方式。

To effectively implement the changes brought by the new policy in a pragmatic and neutral manner, enterprises can advance the work systematically from several levels:

1.Internal Communication: Conduct a special briefing for the board of directors and management in non-technical language, clarifying the DOJ’s current unified corporate criminal enforcement policy and the tiered impact of different choices (self-disclosure, cooperation, remediation) on case outcomes when misconduct occurs;

2.Crisis Response: Add a fixed procedure to the existing cross-border compliance and crisis response manual, specifying that in the event of a material U.S.-related compliance issue, a special task force shall complete a preliminary factual investigation as soon as practicable and assess whether to initiate voluntary self-disclosure in accordance with the new policy;

3.Compliance Systems and Investigation Mechanisms: Review whether the existing compliance system has the ability to early identify high-risk transactions and payments, clear internal escalation paths and cross-departmental working mechanisms, and the capacity to promptly launch internal investigations and form fact-based evidence usable for external communication;

4.Cross-Border Legal Conflict Preparedness: Collaborate with external counsel or advisors in advance to assess the feasible boundaries of corporate cooperation when the DOJ requests it in relation to cross-border data, confidentiality obligations, and Sino-foreign legal conflicts, and form an internal principled position to avoid coordination only after the case enters the substantive investigation stage;

5.M&A and Investment: Explicitly stipulate in the terms of U.S.-related M&A and investment transactions how all parties will jointly assess self-disclosure if potential criminal risks are discovered during due diligence or after closing, and how the additional costs and penalties arising from self-disclosure will be allocated in price adjustment and compensation arrangements.

以上安排，对于在美国有业务、在美上市、接受美国金融机构融资或使用美元清算的业务线，应该规划一些专项培训，重点不是解释条文，而是通过几个简单情景，讲清楚“早报、晚报、不报”在新政策下各自的后果区间。

For business lines with U.S. operations, U.S. listings, financing from U.S. financial institutions, or U.S. dollar clearing, special training should be planned, focusing not on interpreting provisions but on clarifying the respective outcome ranges of "early disclosure, delayed disclosure, and non-disclosure" under the new policy through simple scenarios.

在多数情况下，是否以及何时向司法部自愿披露，很少是一个单纯法律问题，更是一个综合权衡商业、声誉、监管和多法域法律后果的董事会决策。新政策的价值，在于让这个决策过程比过去更有“刻度”，企业可以在更可预期的框架内做出选择。从合规与法律实务角度看，司法部此次统一政策，进一步明确了自愿披露、充分合作、及时整改与从宽处理的对应关系，提升了跨境企业涉美刑事风险应对的可预期性。这一规则既强化了企业主动合规的激励，也对内部调查、跨境数据协作、危机处置和并购风控提出了更高要求。对中资跨境企业而言，关键是将新政策纳入常态化合规体系，前置风险研判与预案，在法律冲突边界内建立清晰的决策机制，实现风险可控与合规价值最大化。

In most cases, the decision of whether and when to make a voluntary self-disclosure to the DOJ is rarely a purely legal issue, but rather a board-level decision that requires a comprehensive weighing of commercial, reputational, regulatory, and multi-jurisdictional legal consequences. The value of the new policy is that it makes this decision-making process more "calibrated" than before, allowing enterprises to make choices within a more predictable framework. From a compliance and legal practice perspective, the DOJ’s unified policy further clarifies the correlation between voluntary self-disclosure, full cooperation, timely remediation and lenient treatment, enhancing the predictability of cross-border enterprises’ response to U.S.-related criminal risks. This rule not only strengthens the incentives for enterprises to proactively comply but also raises higher requirements for internal investigations, cross-border data collaboration, crisis management, and M&A risk control. For Chinese cross-border enterprises, the key is to integrate the new policy into the normalized compliance system, advance risk assessment and contingency planning, and establish a clear decision-making mechanism within the boundaries of legal conflicts to achieve risk control and maximize compliance value.